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parties were present at the September 12, 1984 hearing before Judge 
Bunnell. Those additional parties were Emery Mining Corporation, 
represented by F. Robert Reeder and Francis M. Wikstrom; Michael C. 
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D. Wheeler; and L. Brent Fletcher, represented by Sumner J. Hatch. 
The Attorney General apparently takes the position that 
Emery Mining Corporation is a proper party on appeal but that 
Messrs. Thompson, Conklin, Ziemski and Fletcher are not. See 
Appellant's Brief at i. In the preliminary hearings before this 
Court, counsel for Emery Mining Corporation and counsel for the 
individuals, Thompson, Conklin, Ziemski and Fletcher have all been 
present and have participated in the proceedings, including the 
filing of motions. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Utah Code Ann. SS 77-22-1 through 3 (1953) 
(the "Mini-Grand Jury Act") violates either the Constitution of 
Utah or the Constitution of the United States because it permits 
the compulsory processes of the State to be employed without 
sufficient judicial supervision and without adequate procedural 
safeguards. 
2. Whether proceedings conducted by prosecutors under the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act are accusatory in nature and therefore require 
greater due process procedural safeguards than are provided under 
the Act. 
3. Whether the Mini-Grand Jury Act violates the 
Constitution of Utah because it fails to require prosecutors to 
disclose to witnesses the nature and scope of the criminal 
investigation pursuant to which they have been subpoenaed. 
4. Whether the Mini-Grand Jury Act violates the 
Constitution of Utah because it fails to require prosecutors to 
give target warnings and to advise witnesses of their right to 
assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 
5. Respondent Utah Power and Light Company incorporates 
by this reference the additional issues presented on appeal that 
are set forth in the briefs of Respondents Colby, Stott, Maxfield 
and of Respondent Emery Mining Corporation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a September 20, 1984 final order of 
the Seventh Judicial District Court, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell/ in 
which he declared the so-called Mini-Grand Jury Act, Utah Code Ann. 
SS 77-22-1 through 3 (1953), unconstitutional and withdrew judicial 
authorization for the Utah Attorney General to continue the 
criminal investigation previously approved by the court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah Power and Light Company is in basic agreement with 
the Attorney General's statement of the facts except for two points 
that warrant clarification. See Appellant's Brief at 5-9. The 
Attorney General correctly states that Messrs. Darcie H. White, 
W. Jack Eliason, Scott H. Christensen and David Clement appeared 
pursuant to subpoena in April, 1984, with counsel and were deposed. 
Mr. Richard J. Riche also was deposed in April, 1984. Each of 
these men is or at one time has been employed by Utah Power and 
Light Company. 
Mr. Nebeker, who accompanied each of these men to their 
depositions, specifically and repeatedly inquired of the Assistant 
Attorneys General conducting the depositions whether these men were 
subjects or targets of the criminal investigation. See Depo. of 
Darcie H. White at 4-6 (Apr. 3, 1984); Depo. of W. Jack Eliason at 
3-4 (Apr. 3, 1984); Depo. of Scott H. Christensen at 4 (Apr. 13, 
1984); Depo. of Richard J. Riche at 3-5 (Apr. 17, 1984) (The cited 
portions of these depositions are included in the Addendum.) 
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Furthermore, Mr. Nebeker explicitly stated his reasons for 
wanting to know whether any of the witnesses were targets of the 
investigation. At the outset of Mr. White's deposition, Mr. Nebeker 
stated in part: "I think you should at this time, be required to 
tell him whether or not he is the subject of the investigation 
because I think certain questions that may be put to him may 
require him to take the Fifth Amendment if he deems it necessary. 
I think he's entitled to know that." Depo. of Darcie H. White at 5 
(Apr. 3, 1984). Two weeks later during the deposition of Mr. Riche, 
Mr. Nebeker specifically referred to the procedural safeguards that 
exist in grand jury proceedings and took the position that the same 
safeguards should be extended to Mr. Riche at that deposition. 
Depo. of Richard J. Riche at 4-5 (Apr. 17, 1984). 
At the conclusion of the May 30, 1984 hearing before Judge 
Bunnell, Mr. Nebeker was directed by the court to prepare an order 
setting forth the court's rulings and then circulate it for five 
days among the other counsel for their objections. Transcript of 
the May 30, 1984 Hearing at 72-73. That procedure was followed. 
Because of differences among counsel as to the wording of Judge 
Bunnell's ruling on the constitutionality issue, two versions of an 
order were prepared. No consensus was reached. Finally, to comply 
with the court's earlier direction Mr. Nebeker submitted both 
versions of the order to Judge Bunnell along with a clear 
explanation that the various counsel had been unable to agree upon 
a form for the order. See Record at 361-367. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The so-called Mini-Grand Jury Act suffers from several 
deep-rooted constitutional deficiencies/ some of which are addressed 
by the other respondents in their briefs. The essence of UP&L's 
position is that the Mini-Grand Jury Act does not contain critical 
procedural safeguards that are mandated by the Constitution of the 
United States, the Constitution of Utah and related state law. 
UP&L's analysis is straightforward: The Supreme Court 
precedent which controls the types and extent of procedural 
protections required in this case focuses on whether the body at 
issue performs an investigatory or accusatory function. The 
Attorney General and county attorneys, as the State's own 
prosecutors of criminal offenses, clearly fulfill an accusatory 
role under the Act. Accordingly, greater procedural protections 
must be afforded to persons subpoenaed under the Act than are 
extended to those who are compelled to give evidence before purely 
investigative or fact-finding bodies. 
Notwithstanding the accusatory function filled by 
prosecutors under the Act, it is actually the case that the 
statutes and rules of procedure governing administrative subpoenas 
tend to guarantee the crucial procedural safeguards that are 
missing from the Mini-Grand Jury Act. 
One of the most basic safeguards missing from the Act is 
any provision for ongoing judicial supervision of the subpoena 
power wielded by prosecutors once the criminal investigation has 
started. The Attorney General argues that "inherent" in the Act is 
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the opportunity to move to quash a subpoena and that such a 
procedure allegedly provides an effective pre-compliance remedy 
against prosecutorial abuse* However, the Act does not state 
expressly that any such right exists and ordinary citizens cannot 
be presumed to know that such a right may be inherent in our 
judicial system. Since the Act does not require prosecutors to 
disclose to a witness the nature and scope of the investigation, a 
person subpoenaed under the Act has no basis for determining 
whether the demands of the subpoena are appropriate and cannot make 
an informed decision about exercising his privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
It is beyond dispute that the right to assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination applies to criminal investi-
gations. Utah statutory law, which codifies this Court's 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, requires that target 
warnings and notice of the privilege against self-incrimination be 
given in grand jury proceedings. A refusal to extend the same 
protections to persons compelled to give evidence in proceedings 
under the Mini-Grand Jury Act violates both the equal protection 
and due process provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Finally, the Attorney General should be precluded from 
using any information or evidence gathered as part of this criminal 
investigation in any civil proceeding. Any exception to that 
prohibition must come as a result of express judicial approval 
after a showing of particularized need by the Attorney General. 
No such showing has been made in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MINI-GRAND JURY ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT NEITHER 
ESTABLISHES ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS NOR PROVIDES FOR JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF 
OTHERWISE UNBRIDLED PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION. 
Judge Bunnell in his September 20, 1984 Memorandum 
Decision Relative to Constitutionality summarized in precise terms 
his reasons for declaring Utah Code Ann, §§ 77-22-1 throuqh 3 
(1953)(the "Mini-Grand Jury Act"1 or the "Act") unconstitutional: 
« 
This Court has, therefore, concluded that 
the Act is too vague and does not give proper 
protection to individual citizens against 
violation of their constitutional right of 
due process and protection against self-
incrimination and allows for an absolute abuse 
of power without the benefit of judicial review 
or control once the general subpoena power is 
granted and finds the Act is unconstitutional. 
Id. at 4. Judge Bunnell's observation that the Act "allows for an 
absolute abuse of power without the benefit of judicial review or 
control" accurately protrays the unbridled prosecutorial discretion 
given to prosecutors under the Act. 
Section 77-22-2(1) authorizes the attorney general or any 
county attorney to subpoena witnesses and require the production of 
books, papers, documents, recordings and any other items that 
*This Court in KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1981), 
referred to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 through 3 as the "Mini-Grand Jury 
Act". The Attorney General frequently refers to the statutes as the 
"Subpoena Powers Act". 
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constitute evidence or that "may be relevant to the investigation 
in the judgment of the attorney general or county attorney." The 
plain language of the Act leaves solely to the judgment of the 
prosecutor the determination of what is "relevant" to his 
investigation. The Act imposes no standards or guidelines to limit 
his exercise of judgment. The Act does not expressly authorize 
anyone to second guess his judgment. In short, the prosecutor 
possesses unfettered discretion to employ the powerful enforcement 
machinery of the State any way he wants. 
In an attempt to down play the likelihood of arbitrary or 
capricious conduct, the Attorney General challenges the district 
court*s ruling by claiming that that the opportunity to make a 
motion to quash prior to compliance with a subpoena provides an 
effective remedy against prosecutorial abuse. Appellant's Brief at 
9-10, 13-17. The Attorney General's extensive treatment of this 
point suggests that his reliance on the purported opportunity for 
an effective pre-compliance challenge is the crux of his position. 
Moreover, the Attorney General concedes that "[i]f an investigative 
subpoena is issued or executed in a manner that does not allow 
re-compliance [sic] challenge, it might run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment." Appellant's Brief at 18 (citation omitted). In light 
of that concession, the real issue is whether the manner in which 
the Attorney General is allowed to issue subpoenas under the Act is 
tantamount to no opportunity for a pre-compliance challenge. 
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Utah Power and Light Company ("UPStL") agrees with the 
general proposition that administrative subpoena statutes that 
provide an e f fect ive pre-compliance remedy, which UP&L bel ieves 
necessari ly includes clear notice of the right for judicial 
intervention, pass constitutional muster. However, UP&L sharply 
di f fers with the Attorney General's characterization of the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act as such a statute . The Mini-Grand Jury Act 
does not provide any e f fect ive pre-compliance remedy. The 
subpoenas issued by the Attorney General under the Act in th i s case 
gave the misleading impression that they had been individually 
approved by the d i s t r i c t court and threatened contempt of Court 
sanctions for fa i lure to comply.2 Furthermore, the subpoenas 
gave no clue as to the purpose or scope of the investigation. When 
the language of the Act f a i l s to even inform c i t izens of the right 
to judic ia l ly challenge a subpoena and when the actions of those 
issuing the subpoenas have the effect of further obfuscating that 
right, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to accept the argument that a technical 
right of pre-compliance challenge e f fec t ive ly protects those 
fundamental privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and 
i t s counterpart in the Constitution of Utah.3 
2For example, the May 16, 1984 subpoena issued to the Custodian of the 
Records, Utah Power and Light Company, stated in part: "This Subpoena Duces 
Tecum i s authorized by order of the District Court, Disobedience to this 
order i s punishable by contempt of Court." See Addendum. 
3Article I , section 14 of the Constitution of Utah s tates: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
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The Attorney General spent so much time in his brief 
discussing requirements for subpoenas issued by administrative 
agencies that he never c r i t i c a l l y focused on the determinative 
question of what the Utah Mini-Grand Jury Act actually provides -
or f a i l s to provide. A careful examination of the Act shows that 
i t f a i l s to provide any ef fect ive pre-compliance remedy for at 
least four reasons: (1) the Act does not contain any procedural 
safeguards other than the right to counsel and an award of immunity 
i f a witness i s compelled to give testimony against himself, (2) 
the Act does not give notice of any "inherent" right to challenge 
the subpoena, (3) proceedings under the Act are accusatory, not 
investigatory in nature, and (4) the Act f a i l s to establ ish even 
the key procedural safeguards contained in purely invest igative 
subpoena statutes or regulations. 
A. The Mini-Grand Jury Act Lacks Essential Procedural Safeguards. 
Apart from a right to counsel and an award of immunity i f 
a subpoenaed person i s compelled by a court to give incriminating 
3Continued; 
against unreasonable searches and se izures 
s h a l l not be v i o l a t e d ; and no warrant s h a l l 
i s sue but upon probable cause supported by oath 
or aff irmation, part icu lar ly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or thing 
to be s e i z e d . 
I t a l so should be noted that the Fourth Amendment has been held 
applicable to corporations. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v . 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205-06 & n .35 , 90 L. Ed 2d 614, 628 & n .35 , 66 S. Ct. 
494 (1946) and cases c i t e d therein. 
- 9 -
testimony against himself, the Mini-Grand Jury Act does not 
provide any procedural safeguards to the subpoenaed person. In 
fact , the Act expressly s ta tes that M[t]he subpoena need not 
disc lose the names of possible defendants and need only contain 
not i f icat ion that the testimony of the witness i s sought in aid of 
criminal investigation." Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-1(2). The Act 
f a i l s to require prosecutors (1) to inform witnesses of the nature 
and scope of the invest igation, (2) to give target warnings, and 
(3) to advise witnesses of their right to assert the pr iv i lege 
against self - incrimination. 4 
B. The Mini-Grand Jury Act Provides No Notice Of The 
Avai labi l i ty Of A Pre-Compliance Remedy For Challenging 
The Validity Or Reasonableness Of A Subpoena. 
Nowhere in the text of the Mini-Grand Jury Act i s there 
any statement that a person served with a subpoena pursuant to the 
Act has a right to move the court to quash or otherwise challenge 
the va l id i ty or reasonableness of the subpoena. The Attorney 
General c i t e s no authority establishing that such a right e x i s t s 
but merely asserts that "[tlhe opportunity to challenge a subpoena 
i s inherent in Utah's Act." Appellant's Brief at 19; see id. at 
10, 17, 26, 45. Although Judge Bunnell did entertain motions to 
4If this Court were to conclude, as UP&L contends infra at 12-19, that 
proceedings under the Act are actually accusatory rather than purely 
investigative in nature, then the Court should consider whether due process 
requires the additional procedural safeguards of the right to present 
evidence and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses• 
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quash subpoenas in this proceeding, nothing in the language of the 
Act suggests that he was under any obligation to do so.s The 
complete absence of any provision in the Act clearly stating that 
such a right exists underscores the deficiency of the statute. A 
person who (a) cannot afford to retain legal counsel, (b) does not 
believe that he may need legal counsel because the subpoena on its 
face does not appear to implicate him, or (c) does not think that 
retaining legal counsel would be useful since the subpoena purports 
to already have been issued (and therefore by implication reviewed) 
by order of the district court, should not be expected to know 
about either the existence or efficacy of some right "inherent" in 
the Act that he can exercise. 
5Although UP&L certainly does not maintain that the district court was 
without power to quash the subpoenas issued pursuant to the criminal 
investigation it approved, UP&L does contend that an express grant of that 
power is neither found in the Act nor in the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure* Rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in part 
that "[t]he court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable." However, Rule 14(a) which enumerates certain types of 
subpoenas does not appear to encompass subpoenas issued by the Attorney 
General under the Mini-Grand Jury Act unless it be by implication. Rule 
14(a) states in part: 
A subpeona to require the attendance of a witness or 
interpreter before [1] a court, [2] magistrate, or 
[3] grand jury, in connection with a criminal investi-
gation or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with 
whom the information is filed, the county attorney on his 
own initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or 
the court in which an information or indictment is to be 
tried. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-14. 
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The Attorney General's argument that the Mini-Grand Jury 
Act provides an effective pre-compliance remedy is predicated on 
two erroneous assumptions: First, the Attorney General equates 
investigative proceedings under the Mini-Grand Jury Act with those 
conducted by federal administrative agencies, legislative 
committees, or even grand juries. See discussion regarding grand 
juries in Section III, infra at 36-43. Secondly, the Attorney 
General proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the two procedural 
safeguards contained in the Mini-Grand Jury Act are somehow 
equivalent to the multiple procedural safeguards embodied in the 
statutes or rules of procedure governing federal administrative 
agencies, legislative committees or grand juries. 
C. Prosecutors' Actions Under The Mini-Grand Jury Act 
Are Accusatory, Rather Than Purely Investigative Or 
Fact-Finding In Nature. 
UP&L disputes the Attorney General's apparent suggestion 
that this case is governed by Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 90 L. Ed. 614, 66 S. Ct. 494 (1946). Walling 
is of some relevance, but UP&L maintains that the controlling cases 
are Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 80 S. Ct. 
1502 (1960) and Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 23 L. Ed. 2d 
404, 89 St. Ct. 1843 (1969). The Supreme Court in Walling 
established standards to govern administrative subpoenas which are 
not the same as those issued by a prosecutor under the Act. In 
Hannah and Jenkins, the Court distinguished between accusatory and 
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purely investigative bodies and made clear that due process 
requires greater procedural safeguards in accusatory proceedings. 
1. Hannah v. Larche—Establishment of the 
Accusatory/Investigatory Distinction. 
In Hannah, the Federal Commission on Civil Rights sought 
review of two lower court judgments that invalidated certain rules 
of procedure adopted by the Commission pursuant to which it was 
holding hearings in Louisiana to investigate alleged Black voting 
deprivations. The voting registrars and private citizens who 
brought suit to challenge the Commission's hearings argued that the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required under the 
circumstances of that case that (1) they be informed of the 
specific charges being investigated, (2) the identity of the 
complainants be revealed, and (3) they be entitled to cross-examine 
the complainants and other witnesses. 
In determining what procedural rights the subjects of the 
investigation were to be afforded, the Supreme Court began its 
analysis by explaining that the requirements of due process 
frequently vary according to the type of proceeding involved. The 
Court then outlined the duties to be performed by the Commission 
which consisted of investigating written, sworn allegations of 
discrimination; studying and collecting information on legal 
developments relating to equal protection of the laws; and 
reporting to the President and Congress on its activities, findings 
and recommendations. Id., 363 U.S. at 440-41, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 
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1320. Regarding the nature of the Commission's function, the Court 
concluded: 
As its] apparent from this brief sketch of 
the statutory duties imposed upon the Commission, 
its function is purely investigative and fact-
finding . It does not adjudicate. It does not 
hold trials or determine anyone's civil or 
criminal liability. It does not issue orders. 
Nor does it indict, punish or impose any legal 
sanctions. It does not make determinations 
depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or 
property. In short, the Commission does not and 
cannot take any affirmative action which will 
affect an individual's legal rights. The only 
purpose of its existence is to find facts which 
may subsequently be used as the basis for 
legislative or executive action. 
Id., 363 U.S. at 441, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1320-21 (emphasis added). 
Having concluded that the Commission's function was purely 
an investigative and fact-finding one, the Court elaborated upon 
the difficulties that would arise if the more complex procedural 
safeguards traditionally associated with the judicial process were 
infused into the investigative process. The Court explained in 
some detail that the Commission's procedures were not foreign to 
the procedures used in other forms of governmental investigation, 
e.g., legislative committees, administrative regulatory agencies 
(specific reference was made to the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission), presidential commissions 
and grand juries. See id., 363 U.S. at 444-449, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 
1322-25. The Court clearly noted that it was not suggesting that 
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the investigative functions performed by legislative committees, 
grand juries and executive agencies were identical in all 
respects.* 
2. Jenkins v. McKeithen—Clarification of the 
Accusatory Function. 
In Hannah, the decisive dist inct ion was whether the 
invest igat ive a c t i v i t i e s of the Commission affected legal rights or 
not. Further c lar i f icat ion of that dist inct ion came in Jenkins, 
supra, when an invest igative commission was determined to be 
different from other administrative agencies and executive 
commissions because i t served an accusatory function. In Jenkins, 
a labor union member brought an action for declaratory and 
injunctive re l ie f challenging the const i tut ional i ty of a Louisiana 
statute and the actions of state o f f i c i a l s thereunder. The statute 
€The Court s ta ted on t h i s point: 
Although we do not suggest that the grand jury and the 
congressional inves t iga t ing committee are i d e n t i c a l in 
a l l respects to the Civ i l Rights Commission,30 we 
mention them, in addit ion to the executive agencies and 
commissions created by Congress, to show that the rules 
of t h i s Commission are not a l i e n to those which have 
h i s t o r i c a l l y governed the procedure of inves t iga t ions 
conducted by agencies in the three major branches of our 
Government. 
Hannah, supra, 363 U.S. at 449 & n.30 , 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1325 & n .30 . Cit ing to 
Walling and other c a s e s , the Court did observe in footnote 30 that courts had 
"likened" i n v e s t i g a t i v e agencies of the executive branch to a grand jury. 
For a comparison of the Utah grand jury s ta tutes and the Mini-Grand Jury Act, 
see Sect ion I I I , infra at 36-43. 
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in question created a Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry that 
investigated, only upon referral from the Governor, alleged 
criminal violations in the field of labor-management relations. 
The statute authorized the Commission to hold public hearings to 
determine whether probable cause existed to believe that criminal 
violations had occurred, to make public findings, and to recommend 
to appropriate authorities that criminal prosecutions be 
commenced. Nothing in the statute provided for the preparation of 
findings or reports to be submitted to the Governor or the 
legislature for the purpose of legislative action. 
The Louisiana statute did grant certain procedural rights 
to witnesses. Those persons subpoenaed to testify were given 
"notice of the general subject matter of the investigation." Id., 
395 U.S. 15 417, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 414. In addition to the right to 
counsel, a witness was entitled to have his own counsel both 
question him as to any relevant matter and submit proposed 
questions to the Commission to ask other witnesses. Furthermore, 
the Commission had the right to meet in executive session when it 
appeared that "testimony to be given 'may tend to degrade, defame 
or incriminate any person.1" Id. 395 U.S. at 418, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 
414. In executive session the person who might be degraded, 
defamed or incriminated was entitled to appear and be heard, and to 
call a reasonable number of witnesses on his behalf. 
The Supreme Court specifically noted that the Louisiana 
statute had been drafted with the Court's decision in Hannah in 
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mind. This meant that the Louisiana Legislature had attempted to 
characterize the Commission as an investigatory body so that the 
more rigorous procedural safeguards applicable to accusatory bodies 
would not be required in the Commisssion's proceedings. However, 
the Court concluded that its earlier decision in Hannah was not 
controlling in Jenkins because of substantial factual differences 
between the two cases. 
Whereas the Court in Hannah found the function of the 
Commission on Civil Rights to be a purely legislative and 
fact-finding one, it found that the function of the Commission of 
Inquiry in Jenkins was limited to criminal law violations. The 
Court observed that "everything in the Act points to the fact that 
it is concerned only with exposing violations of criminal laws by 
specific individuals." Jenkins, supra, 395 U.S. at 427, 423 L. Ed. 
2d at 420. The Court in a plurality opinion7 concluded that due 
process at least required the rights of confrontation, cross-
examination and presentation of evidence, but left to the lower 
court in the first instance the responsibility to determine the 
extent of the procedural safeguards to be employed. Id., 395 U.S. 
at 430, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 421-22. 
In addition to the three justices who joined in the plurality opinion, 
Justices Black and Douglas, who had dissented in Hannah, only concurred in 
the result in Jenkins because the opinion did not go far enough. Jenkins, 
supra, 395 U.S at 432-33, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 423. Both Justices Black and 
Douglas believed that the commissions• proceedings in both Hannah and Jenkins 
clearly violated due process. 
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3. The Hannah/McKeithen Analysis Pinpoints the 
Glaring Due Process Deficiencies of the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act. 
The accusatory function performed by prosecutors under the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act is even more clear cut than that of the 
Commission of Inquiry in Jenkins. Whereas the Commission of 
Inquiry commenced proceedings only upon referral from the Governor 
and thereafter made recommendations to others that prosecutions be 
instituted, prosecutors under the Mini-Grand Jury Act determine 
themselves who will be investigated and actually conduct the 
prosecutions. There is no provision in the Act stating that the 
Attorney General or county attorneys should make findings to be 
presented to the Legislature, the Governor or other executive 
officers. The Attorney General or county attorneys do not need to 
make findings and then turn them over to some disinterested party 
or prosecuting entity to determine whether a criminal prosecution 
should be instituted because they are the prosecutors. Theirs is 
solely an accusatory function. They are specifically trained for 
that role. They use the Act as a vehicle for the specific purpose 
of gathering evidence to support the criminal charges they intend 
to instigate. If they can gather sufficient evidence to justify 
commencing a criminal prosecution, the criminal prosecution will be 
started. 
As demonstrated by the plain language of the Mini-Grand 
Jury Act itself in section 77-22-2(1), and as conceded by the 
Attorney General, M[t]he only limitation existing in this statute 
is that crime or malfeasance in office be investigated." 
-18-
Appellant's Brief at 21. The declaration in section 77-22-1 states 
that the Act's purpose in part is "to prevent criminal suspects 
from having access to information prior to prosecution and to 
clarify the power of the attorney general and county attorneys to 
errant immunity from prosecution to witnesses whose testimony is 
essential to the proper conduct of a criminal investigation or 
prosecution." (Emphasis added). In view of that explicit language 
declaring the purposes of the Act, it is wholly specious to suggest 
that proceedings under the Act are of no different character than 
those purely investigative activities of legislative committees, 
administrative agencies or presidential commissions. 
Notwithstanding the fact that prosecutors under the Act 
are much more certainly "accusers" than the Commission of Inquiry 
was, the Louisiana statute provided more procedural protections to 
witnesses than the Mini-Grand Jury Act does. The Louisiana statute 
(1) required notice to be given of the general subject matter of 
the investigation, (2) permitted counsel to ask questions of their 
own clients and to submit proposed questions to be asked of other 
witnesses, and (3) under certain circumstances, allowed persons 
under investigation to be heard and to call witnesses on their 
behalf. The Mini-Grand Jury Act, in contrast, only permits a 
witness to be accompanied by counsel. 
D. The Mini-Grand Jury Act Fails To Even Guarantee The 
Key Procedural Safeguards Provided In Statutes And 
Regulations Governing Purely Investigative Subpoenas. 
Assuming for purposes of argument only that investigative 
proceedings under the Mini-Grand Jury Act were of the same 
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character as those conducted by administrative agencies or 
legislative committees, then it stands to reason that the witnesses 
or subjects of criminal investigations being subpoenaed pursuant to 
the Act are entitled to the same procedural safeguards that are 
extended to witnesses or subjects of administrative investigations. 
However, significant disparities exist between the procedural 
safeguards afforded to witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act and those subpoenaed pursuant to federal or 
some state administrative statutes. The Mini-Grand Jury Act does 
not even provide all the essential procedural safeguards that are 
present in many statutes and regulations governing purely 
investigative or administrative subpoenas such as notice of the 
nature and scope of the investigation, the opportunity to challenge 
in court the validity and reasonableness of a subpoena, and the 
right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Careful analysis shows that Walling, supra, which the 
Attorney General cites frequently as authority for his arguments, 
actually undercuts the Attorney General's position that the Act 
offers adequate judicial supervision. Essential to the Court's 
decision in Walling was the fact that judicial involvement was 
expressly provided for by statute before any adverse consequences 
affected individual rights. In Walling, the Court reviewed 
judgments from the Third and Tenth Circuits in which those courts 
either affirmed or directed the respective district courts to enter 
orders requiring two publishing companies to comply with subpoenas 
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duces tecum issued by the Wage Hour Administrator in the course of 
an investigation into the applicability and violations of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. In both instances, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgments of the courts of appeals that the publishing 
companies must comply with the subpoenas duces tecum. To 
understand why the decision and reasoning of the Court in Walling 
undermine the Attorney General's position, the subpoena power 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act must be reviewed. 
Section 9 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 
S 209) makes sections 9 and 10 (15 U.S.C. SS 49, 50) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, relating to the attendance of witnesses and 
production of books, papers and documents, applicable to investi-
gations and hearings provided for under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. The crucial point here is that section 9 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act specifically required the commission to turn to a 
federal district court for enforcement of any subpoena. See 
Walling, supra, 317 U.S. at 200 n.24, 90 L. Ed. at 624 n.24. An 
enforcement action begun in federal district court involved both 
notice and hearing and therefore assured the right to any 
subpoenaed party to raise its objections to the subpoena. It was 
this statutorily prescribed judicial involvement before compliance 
with the subpoena that preserved the constitutionality of the 
procedure. The Court's opinion in Walling repeatedly emphasized 
that the compliance order was proper because the courts, not the 
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Administrator, had reviewed the s i tuat ion and found no abuse or 
lack of authority in the issuance of the subpoenas.1 
The Supreme Court in Hannah, supra, observed that in the 
invest igat ive (not adjudicative) proceedings held by the Federal 
Trade Commission, persons summoned to appear are ent i t l ed under the 
Commission's rules to general notice of the purpose and scope of 
the invest igation. Id . , 363 U.S. at 446, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1323. 
*The fol lowing excerpts from the Court's opinion in Walling, supra, confirm 
that a c t i v e j u d i c i a l supervison of the subpoena requests had occurred: 
[1] No o f f i c e r or other person has sought to enter 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s premises against the i r w i l l , to search them, or 
to s e i z e or examine the ir books, records or papers without 
the ir a s s e n t , otherwise than pursuant to order of court 
authorized by law and made a f t er adequate opportunity to 
present o b j e c t i o n s , which in fac t were made. Nor has any 
object ion been taken to the breadth of the subpoena or to any 
other s p e c i f i c defect which would inva l idate them. 
I d . , 327 U.S. a t 195, 90 L. Ed. a t 622 ( footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added)• 
[2] . . . [Rjequiring them to submit the ir pertinent records 
for the Administrator's inspect ion under every jud ic ia l 
safeguard, a f t er and only a f t e r an order of court made 
pursuant to and in exact compliance with authority granted by 
Congress. 
I d . , 327 U.S. a t 196, 90 L. Ed. a t 622 (emphasis added). 
[3] The Administrator i s authorized to enter and inspec t , but 
the Act makes h i s r ight to do so subject in a l l cases to 
j u d i c i a l supervis ion . Persons from whom he seeks relevant 
information are not required to submit to h i s demand, i f in 
any respect i t i s unreasonable or overreaches the authori ty 
Congress has g iven. To i t they may make "appropriate defense" 
surrounded by every safeguard of j u d i c i a l r e s t r a i n t . 
I d . , 327 U.S. a t 217, 90 L. Ed. at 634 (emphasis added). 
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Since Walling was decided, new legislation has been enacted 
specifically dealing with civil investigative demands initiated by 
the Federal Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C 5 57b-l(c)(l) does not 
require court approval before issuance of such investigative 
demands, but subsection (c)(2) states: "Each civil investigative 
demand shall state the nature of the conduct constituting the 
alleged violation which is under investigation and the provisions 
of law applicable to such violation." 
Besides providing for the right to counsel (subsection 
(c)(12)(D)(i)) and an express right to assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination or any other privilege (subsection 
(c)(12)(D)(ii)), the statute allows a person upon whom a civil 
investigative demand has been served by a commission investigator 
to file with the commission a petition for an order modifying or 
setting aside the demand (subsection (f)). Finally, the commission 
is required to petition an appropriate federal district court for 
enforcement of its investigative demands if a person fails to 
comply or otherwise challenges the demand (subsection (e)). 
The subpoena provision of the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, which applies to most federal administrative 
agencies, expressly notifies interested parties of their right to 
challenge a subpoena: 
Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall 
be issued to a party on request and, when 
required by rules of procedure, on a statement 
or showing of general relevance and reasonable 
scope of the evidence sought. On contest, the 
-23-
court shall sustain the subpoena or similar 
process or demand to the extent that it is 
found to be in accordance with law. In a 
proceeding for enforcement, the court shall 
issue an order requiring the appearance of the 
witness or the production of the evidence or 
data within a reasonable time under penalty of 
punishment for contempt in case of contumacious 
failure to comply. 
5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (emphasis added). Although the statute does not 
expressly state the type of notice, if any, that must be given to 
subpoenaed witnesses, the rules of practice followed by many of the 
agencies notify the witnesses as to the nature and scope of the 
investigation. See, e.g., Appendix to the Opinion of the Court in 
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 454-485, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 1328-52, 
80 S. Ct. 1502 (1960). 
The Attorney General c i t e s the case of In re Investigation 
No. 2 of Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission, 577 P.2d 
414 (N.M. 1978), to support the proposition that investigatory 
subpoenas issued by him are to be equated with administrative 
subpoenas.9 A brief comparison of the provisions of the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act with those of the New Mexico Organized Crime 
Act, as amended, § 39-1-1 et seq . , N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp. 1975 & 
Inter. Supp. 1976-77), c learly shows that even i f subpoenas issued 
by the Attorney General were to be considered the same as 
f I t i s noteworthy that the Supreme Court of New Mexico in determining that 
subpoenas issued by the Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission were 
administrative subpoenas, f i r s t determined that the Commission was an 
investigatory rather than an accusatory body. Id. at 415. Thus, i t used the 
same analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Hannah and Jenkins, supra. 
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administrative subpoenas, the Mini-Grand Jury Act does not provide 
nearly as many procedural safeguards as the New Mexico statute 
does. The following excerpts from the New Mexico Supreme Court's 
opinion identifies the significant differences: 
Under the Act the Legislature provided that 
the Commission must petition the district court 
to obtain a subpoena. The district court must 
determine whether the investigation is within the 
power of the Commission, whether the subpoena is 
definite enough and whether the material sought 
is reasonably relevant. What is reasonably 
relevant depends on the nature and purpose of the 
investigation and relevancy cannot be determined 
in the absence of a stated purpose. Once the 
purpose is ascertained it must be shown that the 
material sought has a logical relation to the 
purpose of the investigation. . . . 
After a subpoena is issued the individual or 
institution upon whom it is served has an 
opportunity to challenge it. The subpoenas 
issued under the Act ask only for voluntary 
compliance. Under § 39-9-4 D, N.M.S.A. 1953 
(Inter. Supp. 1976-77) of the Act the Commission 
is authorized to go to any district court to seek 
enforcement of the subpoena. The Legislature 
must have contemplated that the subpoenaed person 
would be allowed to show at that hearing why the 
subpoena should not be enforced. 
Id. at 416 (emphasis added). 
The very authority cited by the Attorney General to 
buttress his arguments shows the inconsistency of his position. In 
contrast, UP&L's position is sound: Criminal investigations 
conducted by the Attorney General under the Act are accusatory 
rather than investigatory in nature. However, even if this Court 
should determine that the Attorney General's exercise of subpoena 
powers pursuant to the Act is investigatory in nature and therefore 
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comparable to administrative subpoenas, then witnesses are entitled 
to at least the same procedural safeguards that are extended to 
witnesses served with administrative subpoenas. 
E. The Opportunity For A Pre-Compliance Challenge To A 
Subpoena Is Meaningless Unless Witnesses Are Notified 
Of The Nature And Scope Of The Investigation. 
Without at least the guarantee that witnesses subpoenaed 
by the Attorney General will be informed as to the nature and scope 
of the investigation, the alleged opportunity for a pre-compliance 
challenge to the subpoena is meaningless. Even assuming for the 
moment that Walling were controlling here, which is the assumption 
upon which the Attorney General proceeds, the Supreme Court's 
opinion states that the scope of the inquiry must be known to 
determine the reasonableness of a subpoena: 
[T]he requirement of reasonableness . . . comes 
down to specification of the documents to be 
produced adequate, but not excessive, for the 
purposes of the relevant inquiry. Necessarily, 
as has been said, this cannot be reduced to 
formula; for relevancy and adequacy or excess in 
the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable 
in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of 
the inquiry. 
Id., 327 U.S. at 209, 90 L. Ed. at 630 (footnote omitted). 
Inasmuch as the Attorney General maintains that the "burden of 
persuasion" as to both the relevancy and adequate specification 
requirements are upon the party challenging the subpoena, see 
Appellant's Brief at 24, a party subpoenaed by the Attorney General 
under the Act is in the precarious situation of bearing the burden 
of having to show that a subpoena is irrelevant or excessive 
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without knowing the nature, purposes or scope of the criminal 
investigation as originally approved by the district court. 
Neither relevance nor reasonableness can be determined 
in a vacuum. A party can make a reasoned and intelligent decision 
whether to comply with or challenge a subpoena duces tecum only if 
it knows the nature and scope of the investigation pursuant to 
which the subpoena was issued. For example. Judge Bunnell pointed 
out that "[a] previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General's 
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light Company's 
dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the original Good Cause 
Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal dealing in this 
area." Memorandum Decision at 2. 
Judge Bunnell alluded to the statutory requirement that 
the Attorney General or a county attorney apply to and obtain the 
approval of a district court, for good cause shown, to conduct a 
criminal investigation. Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-1(1). The 
Mini-Grand Jury Act also authorizes the district court upon 
application of the prosecutor to issue a secrecy order which was 
done here. Id. at S 77-22-2(3). Since the good cause showing is 
the prosecutor's declaration to the court of the justification(s) 
for allowing the criminal investigation and delineates the nature 
and scope of the investigation, a subpoenaed party has no basis for 
determining the appropriateness of the subpoena duces tecum unless 
it is informed as to the nature and scope of the investigation. 
Because the Act does not require the prosecutor to disclose to the 
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witness the nature and scope of the investigation, the party's only 
hope of discovering the nature and scope of the investigation is if 
it is granted by the court an opportunity to review the good cause 
showing. However, the Act makes no provision for such an 
examination. 
Judge Bunnell, in a dialogue with one of the Assistant 
Attorneys General about the operation of his order that the 
Attorney General could not use the criminal investigation to 
venture into civil matters or to explore matters beyond the good 
cause showing, expressed during the May 30, 1984 hearing his 
uncertainty and frustration over the procedure that should be 
followed to permit a party to challenge a subpoena: 
But I think the nature and scope would be 
those general terms that you've used in your 
good cause order. 
There's one point in this statute that 
bothers me a little bit, you see, and that is 
when does an accused get the opportunity to 
challenge what I've just ordered. Because he's 
never allowed to see the good cause order or 
its content unless you come in, I guess, and 
make application to make it known to him. I 
don't know. You see, on search and seizure, 
all that's available,' the affidavit, whether 
hte [sic] officer saw the guy do it and swears 
to it, and the Courts review it to see whether 
he's right. This thing—it troubles me a 
little that we don't allow anybody to see that 
that's being investigated. So he never 
knows. . . . 
Transcript of May 30, 1984 Hearing before Judge Bunnell at 46-47. 
Judge Bunnell assumed that an in camera inspection of the 
original good cause showing might be available. He reasoned by 
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analogy to search and seizure procedures that such a safeguard 
should be available. An Assistant Attorney General, without citing 
any provision in the Act or other authority, then suggested that in 
camera inspection was clearly available. Id. at 47-48. Judge 
Bunnell simply concluded: "That could be possible. If they want to 
see it, perhaps they could petition and maybe we'll let you see it, 
Mr. Nebeker and Mr. Holbrook." Id. at 48. If the very judges who 
are called upon to interpret the Act and protect the rights of 
individuals cannot ascertain with confidence the manner in which 
the Act is to operate and cannot define the procedural safeguards 
to which a person is entitled under the Act, then it defies reason 
and makes a mockery of due process to claim that such a statute 
provides the ordinary citizen who is unschooled in the law with an 
effective pre-compliance opportunity to challenge a subpoena. 
Perhaps the most insidious aspect of the Attorney 
General's argument that a motion to quash is a sufficient remedy 
against a denial of constitutional rights is that such a system 
would place upon individual citizens the economic and legal burden 
of policing the state's use of its power. Our constitutional 
system was designed to insure just the opposite result. The vast 
resources and compulsive powers of government may be levelled 
against individuals only in carefully defined ways. They may not 
be unleashed without regard for individual rights until held 
accountable by citizens who wade through the judicial process to 
obtain relief. The Constitution prohibits the government from 
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doing certain things to citizens and dictates that other things be 
done only within carefully drawn limits. The only effective 
pre-compliance safeguard against abuses by prosecutors is the 
Constitution itself, not a motion to quash. 
II. UTAH LAW REQUIRES THAT WITNESSES SUBPOENAED TO TESTIFY IN A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BE ADVISED OF THEIR RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND BE INFORMED IF THEY ARE OR WHEN 
THEY BECOME TARGETS. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution establishes 
the right against self-incrimination and states in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, . . . The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; . . . . 
(Emphasis added). Whereas the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," the Utah 
Constitution provides that an accused "shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself." (Emphasis added). The distinction 
is significant because the Utah constitutional privilege is broader 
in its protection than the Fifth Amendment in that it does not 
require an accused to give "evidence" (implies either testimonial 
or tangible evidence) against himself whereas the Fifth Amendment 
only protects a person from having to be a "witness" (implies 
testimonial evidence alone) against himself. See State v. 
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McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 
315, 316-17 (Utah 1980). Thus, under the Utah Constitution one 
cannot be compelled to produce books, records, documents or papers 
that would incriminate himself. 
A. The Privilege Against Compelled Self-incrimination 
Applies To Criminal Investigations. 
In detailing the breadth of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court stated in In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. I, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967): 
The privilege can be claimed in any 
proceeding, be it criminal or civil, 
administrative or judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory . . . it protects any disclosures 
which the witness may reasonably apprehend could 
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could 
lead to other evidence that might be so used. 
id. 387 U.S. at 47-48, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 557 (emphasis in the 
original) guoting Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York 
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678, 704, 84 S. Ct. 1594 
(1964) (White, J., concurring). That same principle has since been 
reaffirmed in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 464, 42 L. Ed. 2d 
574, 587, 95 S. Ct. 584 (1975), and in Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441, 444, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 1653 (1972). The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that the Utah constitutional 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to grand 
jury proceedings. State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, 
973 (1967). The Utah Legislature later codified that rule by 
enacting Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3. 
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B. Under Utah Law A Subpoenaed Person Has The Right 
To Be Informed That He Is A Target Of A Criminal 
Investigation. 
The respective courts of last resort have interpreted both 
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Utah 
to extend the right against self-incrimination to criminal 
investigations. As an added protection, under Utah law, the 
subject of a criminal investigation when compelled to give evidence 
against himself must be advised that he is a target of the 
investigation. The rationale underlying the target warning 
requirement is that unless a potential defendant is advised that 
charges might be brought against him, he is not in the position to 
make an informed and intelligent decision about exercising his 
right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 
The leading Utah Supreme Court case on the duty of 
prosecutors to disclose to witnesses who are compelled to testify 
that they are targets of a criminal investigation is State v. 
Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967). In Ruggeri, the 
State of Utah sought an extraordinary writ in the nature of 
mandamus to compel a state district court judge to reverse his 
holding and admit into evidence testimony that he had ruled to be 
inadmissible. Judge Ruggeri, in a matter before him, had granted 
defendant's motion to suppress testimony given before a grand jury. 
C. W. Brady, a county commissioner, had been criticized 
publicly for paying more in rentals on a bit paving machine than it 
would have cost to buy a new machine. Brady was summoned to appear 
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before a grand jury, at which time he requested the assistance of 
counsel. Utah law at that time precluded the presence of counsel 
in the grand jury room. Brady did not know at the time that he was 
the target of the grand jury investigation. He was subsequently 
indicted, along with others, on a criminal conspiracy charge and 
also was indicted for perjury. 
In refusing to issue the requested extraordinary writ, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated in a plurality opinion: 
However, one being investigated for crime 
is not just a witness and cannot be treated as 
such. The target of an investigation is an 
accused within the meaning of the Constitution, 
and when he is detained in any significant way, 
he may not be interrogated unless he is advised 
of the charges against him then under 
consideration. To fail to so warn one so 
being investigated is to entrap him and to 
violate his constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
Whether the examination needed to be 
terminated when Brady requested counsel need not 
be decided, for we think it was improper to call 
him in the first place when the purpose was to 
secure testimony from his own lips to be used 
against him in a trial which would result from 
the proposed indictment. 
Id. at 973 (emphasis added). Although the quoted language appears 
in what is styled as a plurality opinion consisting of two 
justices, an additional justice who concurred in the result stated 
in his concurring opinion that he agreed with the plurality in 
their reasoning on this point.10 
10Justice Ellett authored the plurality opinion in which Justice Tuckett 
concurred. Then-Chief Justice Crockett authored a specially concurring 
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The two jus t i ces concurring special ly echoed the statements 
in the plural i ty opinion to the ef fect that Brady should have been 
informed that he was a suspect in the criminal invest igat ion. 
Then-Chief Justice Crockett wrote in his special concurrence: 
But the important point in my mind i s that 
the d i s t r i c t attorney and the grand jury knew of 
the possible implications of crime and the 
questions being asked, while Brady did not. 
Insofar as i t i s shown in th i s record, the 
questioning of Mr. Brady appears to have been 
part of a sort of general inquiry to discover 
possible misdoings in county government. But 
there was no indication to him that he was 
suspected of any crime, what any such suspected 
crime may have been, nor what connection he or 
the testimony e l i c i t e d might have with i t . He 
therefore would not have any basis for knowing 
how the statements he was making might relate to 
any particular crime, nor whether they might 
implicate him therein, 
10Continued: 
opinion in which Justice Callister concurred. Of particular importance i s the 
opinion of Justice Henroid that i s designated as "concurring in the result ." 
Howeverf the actual language of Justice Henroid's opinion reveals that he 
concurred in more than the result . Justice Henroid stated at the outset of 
his opinion: 
I concur in the result , and in the reasoning of Mr. 
Justice E l l e t t , except that 1 think those cases cited 
anent extraordinary writs do not apply in this particular 
case. 
State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, 977 (1967) (emphasis added). 
The cr i t i ca l language in Justice E l l e t t ' s opinion that bears on the issues in 
this case does not relate at a l l to extraordinary writs. Hence, Justice 
Henroidvs statement that he concurred also in the reasoning of Justice E l l e t t , 
except as i t related to extraordinary writs , indicates that those portions of 
Justice E l l e t t ' s opinion not relating to extraordinary writs command a 
majority of the Court and are not just a plurality position. 
- 3 4 -
To avoid being misunderstood, I interpose 
this observation: I have no doubt that if a 
person testifying before a grand jury falsifies 
concerning a material matter he can be convicted 
of perjury. But the proceedings should be 
carried on properly and with due regard for the 
constitutional rights of the witness. If his 
rights of non-incrimnation and to have counsel 
are to be meaningful, they should be made 
available in a practical way when they are 
needed. The witness should be made sufficiently 
aware of the situation he faces that he is able 
to make an informed and deliberate choice whether 
to waive or to claim those rights. In that 
regard it seems to me that a sense of fairness 
and justice on the part of the district attorney 
and/or the grand jury would suggest that when 
the witness is or becomes the target of an 
investigation for a particular crime he should be 
so advised and afforded an opportunity to invoke 
his constitutional rights if he so desires. Cf. 
Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 
S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed 2d 977. There is no 
indication that this was done here. 
Id. at 976 (emphasis added). Regardless of any differences 
in the underlying reasoning, there was agreement among all five 
justices of the Utah Supreme Court on at least the single point that 
a subpoenaed witness should be informed if he is or becomes the 
target of a criminal investigation. 
Some years after the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Ruggeri, the prevailing rule of law on target warnings was codified 
by the Utah Legislature in 1980. Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3(2), 
relating to the rights of witnesses summoned to appear before grand 
juries, states in relevant part: 
(2) Any person called to testify before the 
grand jury may be advised of his right to be 
represented by counsel. If a witness is or 
becomes a subject of the investigation, he shall 
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be advised of that fact and of his right to 
counsel, and of his privilege against 
self-incrimination. . • • 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the necessity of giving target warnings in 
grand jury proceedings and, UP&L believes, in any criminal 
investigative proceeding, is clearly established in Utah. 
XIX. THE SAME PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS ACCORDED TO PERSONS SUBPOENAED 
TO TESTIFY BEFORE A GRAND JURY MUST BE EXTENDED TO PERSONS 
SUBPOENAED TO TESTIFY UNDER THE MINI-GRAND JURY ACT. 
The Attorney General in advancing his argument that 
subpoenas issued under the Mini-Grand Jury Act should be equated 
with administrative subpoenas seizes upon language from Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 90 L. Ed. 614, 
66 S. Ct. 494 (1946), suggesting that grand jury proceedings are 
comparable to administrative investigatory proceedings. UP&L does 
not dispute the proposition that many administrative agencies 
perform an investigative function that in some respects is similar 
to that of the grand jury, see id., 327 U.S. at 216, 90 L. Ed. at 
634, but maintains that the grand jury definitely fulfills an 
accusatory function that is aided by its investigatory activities. 
The United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 411, 23 L. Ed. 2d 404, 89 S. Ct. 1843 (1969), discussed 
the due process procedural safeguards that should be available 
before bodies that perform an accusatory function. After 
reaffirming that whether a particular procedural right obtains in 
a specific proceeding depends upon a number of factors, the Court 
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focused on the special role of the grand jury that is 
constitutionally sanctioned: 
We do not mean to say that this same 
analysis applies to every body which has an 
accusatory function. The grand jury, for 
example, need not provide all the procedural 
guarantees alleged by appellant to be 
applicable to the Commission. As this Court 
noted in Hannah, "the grand jury merely 
investigates and reports. It does not try." 
Moreover, "[t]he functions of that institution 
and its constitutional prerogatives are rooted 
in long centuries of Anglo-American history." 
Finally the grand jury is designed to interpose 
an independent body of citizens between the 
accused and the prosecuting attorney and the 
court. Investigative bodies such as the 
Commission have no claim to specific 
constitutional sanction. 
Id., 395 U.S. at 430-31, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 422 (citations omitted). 
The Attorney General's willingness to draw parallels 
between grand jury proceedings and proceedings under the Mini-Grand 
Jury Act dissipates when the discussion turns to the critical 
procedural safeguards of advising witnesses of the privilege 
against self-incrimination and giving target warnings. It already 
has been discussed that Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-3(2) codifies the 
Ruggeri rule by requiring that M[i]f a witness is or becomes a 
subject of the investigation, he shall be advised of that fact and 
of his right to counsel, and of his privilege against 
self-incrimination." Whereas those safeguards are expressly 
provided for in grand jury proceedings, they are conspicuously 
absent from the provisions of the Mini-Grand Jury Act. 
A. The Equal Protection Provision Of The 
Constitution Of Utah Requires That An Accused 
Receive The Same Procedural Protections 
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Regardless Of The Manner In Which The Prosecution 
Is Commenced, 
UP&L contends that under Utah constitutional law the same 
procedural safeguards extended to those suspected of criminal 
offenses that are investigated by a grand jury must be granted 
those investigated pursuant to the Mini-Grand Jury Act. A brief 
comparison of prosecution by indictment v i s -a -v i s prosecution by 
information reveals why an accused under either procedure should be 
ent i t led to a parity of protections. F irs t , unlike the federal 
Constitution, the Constitution of Utah spec i f i ca l ly provides for 
alternative i n i t i a l tracks for prosecution. Article I , sect ion 13 
of the Constitution of Utah s ta tes : 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted 
by information after examination and commitment 
by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the 
State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of 
the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be prescribed by the Legislature. 
Moreoever, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure place prosecution 
by indictment or information on a parity with each other . 1 1 
l lRule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to the 
prosecution of public offenses, states in part: 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, a l l offenses shall be 
prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person 
having reason to believe the offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense 
for which the defendant i s being prosecuted by using the 
name given the offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating in concise terms the definition of the offense 
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4. 
Even the statutory definitions of "Indictment" and "Information" 
both define each in part as "an accusation, in writing." Utah Code 
Ann- S 77-1-3 (2), (3). 
Given the fact that prosecutions by indictment or by 
information are on an equal constitutional and statutory footing, 
the immense disparity between procedural protections afforded an 
accused, which disparity is solely a function of the form the 
prosecution takes, raises serious constitutional issues. The 
Constitution of Utah contains its own equal protection clause which 
provides: "All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform 
their government as the public welfare may require." Utah Const, 
art. I, S 2. 
A comparison of the equal protection language from the 
state constitution with that from the federal Constitution which 
states, "nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws," suggests that the wording of the state 
constitution is broader. The phrase "equal protection of the laws" 
from the federal Constitution has given rise to the rational 
relationship test, i.e., the traditional analysis of whether there 
is any rational basis justifying the unequal operation of a 
particular law upon different classes of persons. 
Nothing in the wording of the Utah equal protection 
constitutional provision indicates that it should be confined to 
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the 6ame interpretations given the federal constitutional 
provision. The more expansive language in the Constitution of Utah 
simply states that free governments are founded upon the authority 
of the people for their equal protection. Free governments are 
founded on the authority of all the people, including those who 
have been or might be accused of wrongdoing. Certainly each person 
accused by a prosecutor of a particular offense should be entitled 
to the same protections afforded others accused of the same 
offense, albeit the accusations against others are presented by a 
grand jury. UP&L maintains that article I, section 13 of the 
Constitution of Utah, as presently applied through the derivative 
legislation thereto, impacts discriminatorily upon that class of 
accused persons for which the State elects to prosecute by means of 
an information and for which the State has gathered evidence by 
means of subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum issued pursuant to the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act. 
The current state of the law in Utah assures an accused 
prosecuted pursuant to a grand jury indictment that he will receive 
a target warning and be informed of his right to counsel and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. By contrast, the Act only 
guarantees an accused prosecuted pursuant to an information that he 
will be advised of his right to counsel. It is wholly within the 
discretion of the state's prosecutors to determine which 
prosecution track will be used. This is the very arbitrariness and 
capriciousness that the constitution abhors and that equal 
protection was designed to eradicate. 
-40-
B. The Mini-Grand Jury Act Violates The Due Process 
Clause Of The Constitution Of Utah Because It Does 
Not Require Prosecutors To Notify Witnesses Of The 
Purpose Of The Inquiry. 
Another basis for requiring parity of procedural 
protections comes from the Constitution of Utah's due process 
clause which closely tracks the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and states: "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law." Utah Const, art. I, S 7. The leading case of this Court 
interpreting article I, section 7 of the Constitution of Utah is 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945). This 
Court's extended discussion in Harris of procedural due process 
guarantees arose during its consideration of the procedural 
formalities necessary to sustain a district court's revocation of 
probation. In concluding that one of the essentials of due process 
in depriving one of life or liberty is "notice to the person of the 
inauguration and purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such 
person should appear if he wishes to be heard," this Court stated: 
Some rules affecting all types [of pro-
ceedings], are not found in the statutes, but 
in that great basic body of the law commonly 
known as the decisions or rules of the courts. 
But all these methods and means provided for 
the protection and enforcement of human rights 
have the same basic requirements—that no party 
can be affected by such action, until his legal 
rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a 
person or body authorized by law to determine 
such rights, of which inquiry the party has due 
notice, and at which he had an opportunity to 
be heard and to give evidence as to his rights 
or defenses. 
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Id. at 317 (emphasis added). It should be sel f -evident that the 
l iberty of a person who i s the subject of a criminal invest igat ion 
i s in jeopardy. The criminal investigation i s a preliminary but 
integral part of the prosecution by which one i s potent ia l ly 
deprived of his l iberty . 
Notwithstanding UP&L's argument that an accused should be 
afforded the same procedural protections regardless of whether the 
investigation i s by means of a grand jury or a prosecutor, i f any 
disparity of treatment were to be sanctioned, there i s at least one 
compelling reason why greater protections should be afforded to 
those compelled to give evidence to prosecutors. As previously 
noted, the grand jury system places an independent body of c i t i zens 
between the accused and the prosecutor during the period in which 
the investigation proceeds and during which the determination i s 
made whether to return an indictment.1 2 
12The United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 , 11 , 30 L. 
Ed. 849, 852-53, 7 S. Ct. 781 (1887) f elaborated on the importance of the 
grand jury's independent r o l e : 
Yet the i n s t i t u t i o n [the grand jury] was adopted in t h i s 
country, and i s continued from considerat ions s imi lar to 
those which g ive to i t i t s chief value in England, and i s 
designed as a means, not only of bringing to t r i a l persons 
accused of public offences upon jus t grounds, but a l s o as a 
means of protect ing the c i t i z e n against unfounded accusat ion , 
whether i t comes from government, or be prompted by part isan 
passion or pr ivate enmity. No person s h a l l be required, 
according to the fundamental law of the country, except in 
the cases mentioned, to answer for any of the higher crimes 
unless t h i s body, cons i s t ing of not l e s s than s ix teen nor 
more than twenty-three good and lawful men, s e l ec t ed from the 
body of the d i s t r i c t , s h a l l dec lare , upon careful 
de l ibera t ion , under the solemnity of an oath , that there i s 
good reason for h i s accusation and t r i a l . 
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By contrast, no independent person or group is interposed 
between the accused and the prosecutor during the period of the 
investigation and while a determination is made by the prosecutor 
to file an information. It is true that the information may be 
reviewed by a magistrate who is an independent party, but by that 
point in time evidence incriminating the accused already may have 
been illegally obtained by the prosecutor. That possibility raises 
again the importance of informing a person that he is or has become 
a subject of the investigation so that he can make an intelligent 
and informed decision whether to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Although tainted evidence in the search and 
seizure context may be excluded at trial, the Mini-Grand Jury Act 
in this instance, as in so many others, makes no provision for such 
a procedure. 
C. The Act Should Be Declared Unconstitutional Under the 
Due Process Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine. 
This Court has stated that decisions relating to the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are 
highly persuasive when interpreting the due process clause of the 
Utah constitution. Vali Convalescent & Care Inst i tution v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982). 
The United States Supreme Court in a l ine of cases 1 3 has 
**See, e . g . , Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352f 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 103 S. Ct. 
1855 (1983); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates. Inc. , 
455 U.S. 489, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 
415 U.S. 566, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974); Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972). 
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developed the void-for-vagueness doctrine which "requires that a 
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 909, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983). 
As was the case in Kolender, statutes that run afoul of 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine typically are held to be 
unconstitutional on their face. Id., 461 U.S. at , 75 L. Ed. 
2d at 911. The touchstone for maintaining a facial challenge to a 
law is that it reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369, 
102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982). Although the constitutionally protected 
activity that is ordinarily infringed upon involves the First 
Amendment rights of free speech and association, other conduct is 
also constitutionally protected. In Kolender, for example, the 
Court suggested that to the extent a statute "criminalizes a 
suspect's failure to answer such questions put to him by police 
officers, Fifth Amendment concerns are implicated." Id., 461 U.S. 
at n.9, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 910-11, n.9 (emphasis added). In this 
case, the vagueness of the Mini-Grand Jury Act deters the exercise 
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Hence, constitution-
ally-protected conduct is directly affected. 
The Court has observed that "perhaps the most meaningful 
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aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the 
other principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605, 
613, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974).14 The danger with vague statutes is 
that "[sltatutory language of such a standardless sweep allows 
policemen, prosecutors and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections." Id., 415 U.S. at 575, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 613. 
It is true that the Mini-Grand Jury Act, strictly 
speaking, is not a penal statute. It is most definitely, however, 
a criminal procedure statute that bears directly on penal 
statutes. The Act is, in many instances, the muscle behind the 
penal statutes because it is the means by which prosecutors gather 
evidence to obtain convictions for criminal offenses. Thus, the 
authority given prosecutors in the Act to carte blanche set their 
own standards for criminal procedure is patently unconstitutional 
l4Along the same lines, the Court stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104f 108-09, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227-28, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972): 
[If] arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them. A 
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, 
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. 
(Footnotes omitted). 
-45-
on void-for-vagueness grounds and renders the entire Act unconsti-
tutional on its face. 
IV. EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS CANNOT 
BE USED IN CIVIL ACTIONS UNLESS JUDICIALLY APPROVED AFTER 
A SHOWING OF PARTICULARIZED NEED. 
During the May 30, 1984 hearing, Judge Bunnell ordered, 
among other things, that the "[investigations conducted under the 
authority of the Act must be limited to criminal investigations." 
Memorandum Decision at 2. After the second hearing. Judge Bunnell 
in his Memorandum Decision criticized the Attorney General's use of 
information obtained through this criminal investigation for civil 
proceedings: 
Some criminal charges have already been 
filed in Salt Lake County based upon 
information obtained through this proceeding, 
and a civil antitrust case has been filed in 
Salt Lake County, also as a result of some of 
the information derived from this investigative 
proceeding. This investigative proceeding is 
still open and being used for whatever purposes 
the State desires and solely within their 
discretion under the Act, without limitation as 
to when a criminal investigation becomes a 
prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of 
the findings for civil purposes. 
Id. at 3-4. 
The Attorney General's denial that any portion of the 
civil antitrust action filed in Salt Lake City was based on 
information derived from the criminal investigation, see 
Appellant's Brief at 22, appears to be contradicted by his April 
19, 1984 Motion for Partial Release of Secrecy Order and Order 
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CS#1. (Record at 33-34) . 1 S In arguing that information obtained 
from the criminal investigation may be used in c i v i l proceedings, 
the Attorney General clouds the controll ing rule of law by 
describing the exception to the general rule without c learly 
labeling i t as such. The general rule i s that evidence gathered 
in a criminal investigation cannot be used for c i v i l enforcement. 
The Fourth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas. April. 1978. at 
Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978), cert , denied sub nom. 
Fairchild Industries. Inc. v. Harvey. 440 U.S. 971, 59 L. Ed. 2d 
787, 99 S. Ct. 2294 (1979), made clear that M[ i ] f the powers of 
the grand jury, including the power to subpoena documents, are 
used, not for the purpose of criminal investigation but rather to 
gather evidence for c i v i l enforcement, there ex i s t s an abuse of 
1 5 In h is April 19, 1984 Motion for Part ia l Release, the Attorney General, 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 77-22-2(3) made appl icat ion to the court for an order 
authorizing the re lease of cer ta in information necessary for the f i l i n g and 
presentation of c i v i l and criminal a c t i o n s . The Attorney General s tated in 
part: 
This Motion i s made on the further conclusion that 
cer ta in information gathered during the course of 
the Court's previously authorized inves t iga t ion 
w i l l , of n e c e s s i t y , be made public a t the time of 
the f i l i n g of criminal and/or c i v i l act ions* 
This information includes the contents of 
depos i t i ons , documents and other information 
obtained from wi tnes se s . 
(Record at 3 3 ) . Judge Bunnell granted the Attorney General's 
motion. (Record at 34 ) . 
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the grand jury process." Id. at 1108. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. 
v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1118 (E.D. Pa. 
1976) (grand jury cannot be used by government as cover to obtain 
records for civil investigation). 
Even in United States v. Procter & Gamble Company, 356 
U.S. 677, 683, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077, 1082, 78 S. Ct. 983 (1958), one of 
the cases cited by the Attorney General, the Supreme Court stated 
that if "the prosecution was using criminal procedures to elicit 
evidence in a civil case, . . . it would be flouting the policy of 
the law." In Procter & Gamble, the Court was faced with a 
situation in which counsel for defendants was attempting to gain 
access to a transcript of grand jury proceedings in which no 
indictment was returned but from which the government used 
information to proceed with a civil action for alleged violation of 
the antitrust laws. The Court expressed its great reluctance to 
remove the cloak of secrecy from any more of the grand jury 
proceedings than was necessary. 
It should be readily apparent that Procter & Gamble 
presented a factual situation far different from the circumstances 
of this case. It is beyond dispute that there are extraordinary 
instances in which limited information from a criminal 
investigation properly may be authorized to be used in a civil 
action. However, the use of such evidence is permitted only after 
a showing of particularized need which necessarily means that the 
practice is not favored. Judge Bunnell never was approached with 
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such a showing of particularized need and yet concluded that 
information obtained through the criminal investigation he approved 
was improperly used to assist the Attorney General in its civil 
action in Salt Lake City. 
CONCLUSION 
The Mini-Grand Jury Act is constitutionally flawed. 
Prosecutors1 actions taken under the aegis of the Act are 
accusatory in nature. And yet, persons summoned to give evidence 
pursuant to administrative subpoenas tend to enjoy greater 
procedural protections than are afforded persons under the 
Mini-Grand Jury Act. Because the Act fails to give notice of any 
pre-compliance opportunity to challenge subpoenas and because 
prosecutors are not required to inform witnesses of the nature and 
scope of the investigation, no effective or just pre-compliance 
remedy exists. 
Moreover, Utah law requires that persons compelled to 
appear as witnesses before grand juries be informed if they are or 
become subjects of an investigation and that they be advised of 
their right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Both the equal protection and due process provisions of the 
Constitution of Utah mandate that the same protections be extended 
to those compelled to give evidence under the Mini-Grand Jury Act. 
The constitutional infirmities of the Act relate to its 
basic structure and are so fundamental that they cannot be 
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rectified absent an impermissible, wholesale judicial rewriting of 
the Act. Thus, UP&L submits that Judge Bunnell's September 20, 
1984 Memorandum Decision Relative to Constitutionality should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 357£ day of February, 1985. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
J2JL &**W 
B. Nebeker 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment V: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section l: 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 2: 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the 
people.] 
All political power is inherent in the 
people; and all free governments are founded on 
their authority for their equal protection and 
benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may 
require. 
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Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of lav.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 12: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]' 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 13: 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or 
indictment—Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by 
the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and 
commitment. The formation of the grand jury and 
the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
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Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 14: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. SS 77-22-1 through 3: 
77-22-1. Declaration of necessity. It is 
declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination, that it is necessary to grant 
subpoena powers in aid of criminal investigations 
and to provide a method of keeping information 
gained from investigations secret both to protect 
the innocent and to prevent criminal suspects 
from having access to information prior to 
prosecution and to clarify the power of the 
attorney general and county attorneys to grant 
immunity from prosecution to witnesses whose 
testimony is essential to the proper conduct of a 
criminal investigation or prosecution. 
77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses and 
require production of evidence-Contents of 
subpoena-Interrogation before closed court. 
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of 
a crime, the existence of a crime or malfeasance 
in office or any criminal conspiracy or activity, 
the attorney general or any county attorney shall 
have the right, upon application and approval of 
the district court, for good cause shown, to 
conduct an investigation in which the prosecutor 
may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance 
and testimony under oath before any certified 
court reporter, and require the production of 
books, papers, documents, recordings and any 
other items which constitute evidence or may be 
relevant to the investigation in the judgment of 
the attorney general or county attorney. 
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the 
names of possible defendants and need only 
contain notification that the testimony of the 
witness is sought in aid of criminal 
investigation and state the time and place of the 
examination, which may be conducted anywhere 
within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor issuing 
the subpoena, and inform the party served that he 
is entitled to be represented by counsel. 
Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a 
civil action. 
(3) The attorney general or any county 
attorney may make written application to any 
district court and the court may order that 
interrogation of any witness shall be held in 
secret; that such proceeding be secret; and that 
the record of testimony be kept secret unless and 
until the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
The court may order excluded from any 
investigative hearing or proceeding any persons 
except the attorneys representing the state and 
members of their staffs, the court reporter and 
the attorney for the witness. 
77-22-3. Immunity granted to witness-
Refusal of witness to testify or produce 
evidence-Powers granted prosecuting attorneys in 
addition to other powers. In any investigation 
or prosectuion of a criminal case, the attorney 
general and any county attorney shall have the 
power to grant transactional immunity from 
prosecution to any person who is called or who is 
intended to be called as a witness in behalf of 
the state whenever the attorney general or county 
attorney deems that the testimony of such person 
is necessary to the investigation or prosecution 
of such a case. No prosecution shall be 
instituted against the person for any crime 
disclosed by his testimony which is privileged 
under this action, provided that should the 
person testify falsely, nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to prevent prosecution for 
perjury. 
If during the investigation or prosecution a 
person refuses to answer a question or produce 
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evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be 
incriminated thereby, the attorney issuing the 
subpoena may file a request in writing with the 
district court in which the examination is being 
conducted for an order requiring that person to 
answer the question or produce the evidence 
requested. The court shall set a time for 
hearing and order the person to appear before the 
court to show cause, if any he has, why the 
question should not be answered or the evidence 
produced, and the court shall order the question 
answered or the evidence produced unless it finds 
that to do so would be clearly contrary to the 
public interest, or could subject the witness to 
a criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction. 
If the witness still refuses to answer or produce 
the evidence, he shall be guilty of contempt of 
court and punished accordingly. If the witness 
complies with the order and he would have been 
privileged to withhold the answer given or the 
evidence produced by him except for this section, 
that person shall not be prosecuted or subjected 
to penalty or forfeiture on account of any fact 
or act concerning which, he was ordered to answer 
or produce evidence except he may nevertheless be 
prosecuted or subjected to penalty for any 
perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in 
answering, failing to answer, or for producing or 
failing to produce any evidence in accordance 
with the order. 
The powers specified in this chapter are in 
addition to any other powers granted to the 
attorney general or county attorneys. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3: 
77-11-3. Evidence receivable-Witness to be 
advised of rights. (1) The grand jury shall 
receive no other evidence than is given by 
witnesses under oath or affirmation, or 
documentary evidence, or the deposition of a 
witness taken as provided by law. The grand jury 
shall receive only legal evidence. 
(2) Any person called to testify before the 
grand jury may be advised of his right to be 
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represented by counsel. If a witness is or 
becomes a subject of the investigation, he shall 
be advised of that fact and of his right to 
counsel, and of his privilege against self 
incrimination. On demand of a witness for 
representation by counsel, the proceedings shall 
be delayed until counsel is present. In the 
event that counsel of the witness1 choice is not 
available, he shall be required to obtain or 
accept other counsel. 
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MR. OLSEN: It is. 
MR. NEBEKER: And the subpoena carried that 
designation on it, did it not? 
MR. OLSEN: That's my understanding. Is that 
correct, Wayne? 
MR. WICKIZER: Yes. 
MR. NEBEKER: Secondly, I would like to ask you on 
the record if in fact Mr. Darcie White who has been subpoenaejd 
here is a target in the investigation? 
MR. OLSEN: Right. My response to that, as it was 
off the record, is that we intend to ask Mr. White a series 
of questions concerning his employment and relationships withj 
not only his current employer but with previous employees and! 
contractors with Utah Power & Light. I don't have a more 
specific answer to give than that. 
MR. NEBEKER: Can you state more specifically 
whether or not he is in fact being considered as a target of 
the investigation? 
MR. OLSEN: There isn't a way for me to be more 
specific than that. I think it is fair to say that as we 
continue the investigation, that all persons who we've become^  
aware of or interview or depose, that we would review their 
depositions or information that we gain about those persons 
and review their potential criminal liability. That's as 
1 specific as I'm able to be. 
2 MR. NEBEKER: Well, for the record, I think I woul<3 
3 I say that I don't think that response is adequate because I 
4 think he's entitled to know whether or not he is the subject 
5 of a criminal investigation. I think you should, at this 
6 J time, be required to tell him whether or not he is the subjecjt 
7 of the investigation because I think certain questions that 
8 I may be put to him may require him to take the Fifth Amendment] 
9 if he deems it necessary. I think hefs entitled to know thatj 
10 J MR. OLSEN: I understand that concern and I'm being 
11 I as candid as I can. I think it's fair to say, Steve, that 
12 if there is a question asked, for example, if he did anything 
13 which we may later look at as being a potential criminal 
14 violation, then we would look at it and review it with a 
15 view to potential prosecution. I'm honestly being as 
16 candid as I can about that. I don't know that we have said 
17 as to any person that we have absolutely eliminated that 
18 specific person. We have not done, nor, I think, can we 
19 legitimately do that. I'm honestly not holding back anything 
20 there. That's my response and we're not eliminating anyone 
21 at this point. 
22 MR. NEBEKER: Well, if that's all you're willing 
23 to put on the record, then I guess we'll just have to let 
24 the record stand as it is, but my position is that he's 
25 entitled to know that. I think the Attorney General's offic4 
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1 should be required to tell him that, 
2 EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. OLSEN; 
4 1 Q Mr. White, I wonder if you would give us your full 
5 J name and the spelling of each of the names, please. 
6 A Okay, my name is Darcie, D-a-r-c~i-e, middle initiafl 
7 H, White, W-h-i-t-e. 
8 I Q Mr. White, what is your business and home addresses) 
9 please? 
10 I A My business address is 1407 West North Temple, 
11 Salt Lake City. My home address is 2817 Cherry Blossom Lane 
12 in Salt Lake City. 
13 Q Would you give us your telephone numbers as well, 
14 please. 
15 A At the office, my business phone is 535-2460. At 
16 home, itfs 277-9797. 
17 Q Could you give us your date of birth? 
18 A September 20, 1926. 
19 Q If you would, give us the name of your current 
20 employer? 
21 A Utah Power & Light Company. 
22 0 How long have you been employed with Utah Power & 
23 Light? 
24 A Just short of 34 years. 
25 Q What is your current position? 
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 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I W. JACK ELIASON, 
3 | called as a witness by and on behalf of the Attorney General, 
4 J being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows 
5 J MR. OLSEN: The record should reflect that 
6 [Mr. Eliason has been sworn in this case. Let me just 
7 indicate that present are Mr. Eliason and his attorney, 
8 Mr. Steve Nebeker; Mr. Stan Olsen from the Attorney General's 
9 office, Suzanne Dallimore from the Attorney General's office, 
10 and an investigator, Mr. Wayne Wickizer from the Attorney 
11 General's office. 
12 I MR. NEBEKER: Let me also ask, Mr. Olsen, the same 
13 question that I asked you before with regard to whether or 
14 not Mr. Eliason is a target of the investigation that is 
15 being conducted by the Attorney General's office? I would 
16 like to include in that whether or not Utah Power & Light 
17 itself is the subject of the criminal investigation. 
18 MR. OLSEN: Well, I think with respect to the lattejr 
19 question as to whether or not Utah Power & Light is, I think 
20 that initially the affidavit and secrecy order was styled 
21 Utah Power & Light, and I suppose, in a general way, that it 
22 is true that we are looking at a number of aspects which 
23 relate to the company. Again, I want to be as forthright 
24 and candid as I can on that. 
25 MR. NEBEKER: I appreciate that. 
MR. OLSEN: With respect to your second question, 
let me see if I can be more direct and phrase it this way: 
It's my intention to ask a question or questions of 
Mr. Eliason, among many others, and the answers, depending 
on what they are, might indeed subject him to criminal 
liability, depending on the answers. 
MR. NEBEKER: All right, fine. I think we'll let 
him go ahead and answer the questions but I think we under-
stand generally that you're approaching Mr. Eliason the same 
way you're approaching Mr. White in the substance of asking 
him questions and you're leaving open the question of whether| 
or not there might be criminal charges pending. 
MR. OLSEN: That's correct. 
One other further thing in terms of preliminaries, 
Mr. Eliason is here pursuant to our serving of a subpoena 
on him through — 
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, that's correct. 
MR. OLSEN: Mr. Eliason, let me give you a quick 
preliminary — 
MR. NEBEKER: Be sure to keep your voice up, 
Mr. Eliason has a hearing aid and I think he would appreciate] 
it if you would speak loudly to him. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q Mr. Eliason, I don't know if you have had your 
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I would also like to again ask of the representative 
of the Attorney General's Office who's here to take the 
deposition if Utah Power & Light or any officer or employee 
or agent of the company is the target of the investigation 
that's currently being conducted by the AG's office. 
MS. DALLIMORE: Well, in response to that, 
Mr. Nebeker, all I can say is that at this point the focus 
on targets is not completed so that anyone is potentially 
a target of this investigation. Beyond that, I cannot go. 
MR. NEBEKER: Let me again state my objection to 
that response inasmuch as I think we are entitled to know if 
any of those entities, to wit, the company itself, either 
the officers or directors of the company or any agents or 
employees of the company are the target of the investigation. 
We have not had that identified to us at this time. 
MS. DALLIMORE: I would suggest, though, that if 
there are questions that I ask that may incriminate 
Mr. Christensen or may be incriminating to any of your 
other clients, you, of course, would maybe want to think 
about advising him not to answer those. I am sure that you 
will do that. I take it you are here representing 
Mr. Christensen as an officer or employee of Utah Power & 
Light? 
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, I'm here as attorney for Utah 
Power & Light representing Mr. Christensen as an employee of 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
RICHARD J. RICHE, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Attorney 
General's Office, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
MR. OLSEN: The record should reflect that we are 
here pursuant to subpoena and the witness has been sworn. 
Present is the witness; his counsel, Mr. Steve 
Nebeker, Stan Olsen, the attorney from the Attorney General's 
Office; and Wayne Wickizer, also from the Attorney General's 
Office. 
MR. NEBEKER: Mr. Olsen, before we start the 
deposition, I would again make a request similar to the one 
I made before and that is, can you advise Mr. Riche as to 
whether or not he is the subject or target of the investiga-
tion and whether or not Utah Power & Light is, in fact, the 
subject of the investigation. 
MR. OLSEN: Well, I can respond as we have before 
with respect to the witness and maybe a bit more specifically 
with regard to Mr. Riche. He is not at this point con-
sidered a target of any investigation. That is not to say 
that the result of what we find out here would not change 
that, but I'm comfortable in saying to you and to him that 
he's not here and is not specifically the target of our 
investigation at this point. 
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MR. NEBEKER: Okay. 
MR. OLSEN: With regard to the company, we are 
not ruling that possibility out either in previous deposi-
tions or to date. 
MR. NEBEKER: Let me state that under the statute 
that gives the Attorney General's Office that authority to 
proceed with such an investigation, it's my understanding 
that that statute has been referred to as the Grand Jury 
statute. Under Section 77-11-3 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, which deals with the powers and duties of a 
Grand Jury, it states, and I quote, "Any person called to 
testify before the Grand Jury may be advised of his right 
to be represented by counsel." And then it goes on to 
say, "If a witness is or becomes a subject of the investiga-
tion, he shall be advised of that fact and of his right to 
counsel, and of his privilege against self-incrimination." 
And then it goes on to say, "On demand of a witness for 
representation of counsel, the proceedings shall be delayed 
until counsel is present." 
And I really make that statement on the record 
for the reason that we view these proceedings to be under 
the same guidelines as those that relate to Grand Jury, 
Grand Jury investigations, and it's our position—and it 
may be at some time that we'll have to take this to court— 
that each one of the witnesses are entitled to be advised of 
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whether or not they are the subject of the investigation and 
we're entitled to inquire whether or not the company itself 
is the subject of the investigation. However, for purposes 
of proceeding now, we're going to simply make our record 
clear on that matter. 
MR. OLSEN: Okay, understood. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q Sir, will you give us your name,- please, your full 
name? 
A Richard J. Riche. 
Q Will you spell that for the reporter, please. 
A R-i-c-h-a-r-d, capital J., R-i-c-h-e. 
Q And it's pronounced Riche; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Riche, what's your home address? Where do 
you live? 
A It's either Post Office Box 477 or 749, Castle Dale 
Road, Helper, Utah. 
Q How long have you lived at that address, approxi-
mately? 
A Approximately—oh, it's been about 10 years. 
Q Where are you currently employed? 
A With Utah Power & Light out at the Hunter steam 
plant located at Castle Dale. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
t 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION CS NO. 1 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: Custodian of the Records 
Utah Power & Light Company 
Stephen B. Nebeker 
1407 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business 
and excuses and appear at the office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utahf 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., on Thursday, the 31st day of May, 1983, 
to give testimony in support of a criminal investigation. You 
are entitled to be represented by legal counsel. 
You are also commanded to bring with you any and all 
books, records, documents, accounts, or papers pertaining to: 
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1. Invoices, vouchers, checks and all documentation 
in support of requests for reimbursement for guard services 
from MTA and Vanguard for 12/1/77 to the present. 
2. Any and all correspondence to or from MTA, 
Vanguard and L. Brent Fletcher which has not already been 
produced. 
3. Any and all L. Brent Fletcher work product, 
i.e., manuals, forms, documents, papers, research, publications 
and other such records not already produced. 
4. The most recent assignment of contract or other 
agreement between Utah Power and Light and Vanguard. 
5. All expense vouchers and supporting documentation 
for L. Brent Fletcher. 
This Subpoena Duces Tecum is authorized by order of 
the District Court. Disobedience to this order is punishable 
by contempt of Court. 
Given under my hand this day of May, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STANLEY, H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
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